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Introduction
Much has been written concerning the semantics and pragmatics of genitive con-
structions such as:
(1) My cat is orange.       (2) I loaned John my car.
According to the traditional view, the contribution of my to a sentence of the 
form my P is Q is that of picking out a unique member x of the set of objects de-
noted by P and asserting that some relation —canonically that of ownership or pos-
session— obtains between that object and the speaker. In this view, the meaning 
of my thus serves two semantic functions: 1) that of picking out the object x; and 
2) that of asserting that the speaker bears some relation to this object. So according 
to this view, the logical form of a sentence of the form my P is Q is thus something 
on the order of
(3) Q(ix.[own(I,x) ∧ P(x)])
where i corresponds to Russell’s definite description operator and I denotes the 
speaker.
It is evident, however, that (3) fails to account for two straightforward observa-
tions. First, it is easy to construct cases in which an utterance of my P is Q would 
customarily be interpreted as being true but which require us to interpret my P so 
that the object it denotes bears some relation other than that of possession (in either 
a legal or figurative sense) to the speaker. Consider, for instance,
(4) My painting is hanging in the museum
as uttered respectively by an artist, model, and a gallery owner: call these respec-
tively (4’), (4’’) and (4’’’). It seems reasonable to say that we would find (4’) true if 
the speaker bore the relation of having created the contextually salient painting, (4’’) 
true if the speaker was depicted in this painting and (4’’’) if the speaker legally owned 
or bore some other custodial relationship to it. It already seems difficult to construct 
a natural, nondisjunctive characterization of these relations. And this fact is further 
confirmed by consideration of sentences such as
(5) a. My horse is going to win!
 b. My country is occupied by the United States.
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which can also be felicitously uttered in contexts which require us to interpret the re-
lation in question as deviating substantially from any narrow notion of ownership, 
possession or control.
The second obvious problem faced by the traditional analysis of the genitive con-
cerns the uniqueness requirement which comes along with Russellian semantics for 
the definite description operator as it appears in (3). There are, of course, some in-
stances in which a requirement appears to be in force. For instance, it appears infe-
licitous to say
(6) #My cat is orange; my other cat is black
But at the same time, the following parallel sentence seems perfectly fine
(7) My brother got married last month; my other brother was the best man
when uttered in a situation where the speaker has more than one brother.
Problems for current analyses
I will refer to the fact that felicitous uses of genitive constructions in English 
deviate from the Russellian analysis embodied by (3) respectively as the rela-
tional problem and the uniqueness problem. It is my contention that an adequate 
analysis of the semantics and pragmatics of genitive constructions ought to ex-
plain both.
The relational problem is dealt with in a number of recent treatments of the gen-
itive: e.g. Jensen & Vikner (2004), Storto (2004). These proposals attempt to handle 
the potential variability in the relation which may obtain between a speaker and the 
object denoted by a successfully-denoting utterance of a genitive expression my P in 
two different but related ways: a double semantic analysis, and a recourse to the lex-
icon. They appear to approach the problem by shoehorning the source of this rela-
tion into the semantics (and sometimes the syntax) of either the genitive, the head 
noun of the object P, or both.
The first way includes two separate semantic representations for the pre-nominal 
genitive.1 These two representations, their Constructional interpretation and Control 
interpretation, are as follows:
Constructional: lP[lR[lP[P(lu[∃x[∀y[R(u)(y) ↔ y = x] & P(x)]])]]]
Control: lP[lQ[lP[P(lu[∃x[∀y[[control(u)(y) & Q(u)] ↔ x = y] &P(x)]])]]]
The Constructional interpretation is meant to represent the type of relation that 
is available when the genitive combines with a relational N-bar, the relation being 
derived “either from the Argument structure, or from the Constitutive role, or from 
the Agentive role of the head noun” [Jensen & Vikner 2004: 9]. The Control inter-
pretation takes care of the remaining cases, presumably those where a more clear-cut 
“control” type relation can be posited to obtain between the two nouns. It appears 
1 Their analysis focuses on the ‘s construction, however it is intended to cover all relationships po-
tentially categorized as genitive, including the possessive pronoun cases.
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that they did attempt to work in a Montague-style quantificational interpretation of 
the definite article, as seen in the lambda expressions above.
The use of the universal quantifier in this way seems to be intended to ensure 
that there is only one x satisfying the condition, thus ensuring definiteness. How-
ever, as their analysis progresses, they drop this feature from their interpretation and 
are left with an indefinite expression. This is a problem because although the issue of 
uniqueness does not appear to be constantly present in all genitive constructions, it 
is clear that many do implicate, if not entail, that there be no more than one object 
standing in the relation. Indeed, the very sporadic nature of this uniqueness require-
ment should be explained by any analysis of the genitive.
But lack of definiteness is not the only flaw in their analysis. Jensen & Vikner 
also rely heavily on the lexicon to provide their relation in each case. This is the 
second way in which they attempt to account for the variability of the nature of 
the relation that obtains. According to their analysis, “the control interpretation 
is the interpretation that is most salient in examples such as Ann’s car, Bill’s pen-
cil, her pearl, his stone, my monkey, your apple, our room, when the context does 
not indicate a particular pragmatic interpretation” (Jensen & Vikner 2004: 11). 
But note that it is difficult to imagine how to go about figuring out what it might 
mean for one interpretation to be “most salient” if the context does not supplying 
such information. In fact, it doesn’t seem possible to define what “salient” might 
mean without recourse to the idea of a context. Take an example sentence such as 
“The sheep strolled across the meadow.” Outside of any context, it is impossible to 
know whether the sheep, or the meadow, or the act of strolling itself is the most 
salient constituent of that sentence. For note that the sentence could be uttered in 
response to a number of different questions, such as “where did the sheep go?” or 
“which animals have been by here?” It is certainly true that salient is a term that 
has a number of varying definitions in the current literature; however they all do 
make reference to a context or a discourse in which the salient element is embed-
ded.
If proponents of this view are not able to rely on the context to provide the na-
ture of the relationship in question, then given that it is not unambiguously deter-
mined by their semantic interpretation of the genitive (nor could it possibly come 
from the syntax), the only remaining place to look in order to determine the nature 
of the relation which is required for the interpretation of the sentence in question is 
in the semantics of the head noun itself.
The primary component of Jensen & Vikner’s analysis is in fact taken up by an 
elaborate explanation of how the various possible relations which a speaker can bear 
to an item falling under a head noun P may be taken to be stored along with the 
lexical entry for P. One of the cases they consider is nouns denoting regions 
of the earth: e.g. forest, lake, sea, city, country, island, etc. As these terms denote phys-
ical objects, their denotations have physical parts, which are in turn denoted by an-
other class of nouns such as rock, soil, and water. According to Jensen & Vikner, 
what l icenses the acceptability of constructions such as
 (9) the lake’s surface water
(10) the island’s fertile soil
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is that terms such as water and soil are marked in the lexicon in some manner that 
encodes the fact that the items in the classes of objects they denote may be material 
constituents of the objects denoted by other concrete nouns like lake and island.
Regions can also designate habitats, and so any nouns referring to types of plants or 
animals must also be listed in the lexicon as possible parts of a region (Jensen & Vikner 
2004: 15), thereby licensing the lake’s fish and the island’s birds. They go on to note that 
a “social region noun” can also refer to the human society which is located in the region. 
And parts of human societies are their physical and cultural artifacts. So Iceland’s chief-
tains can be explained due to the fact that chieftain is listed in the lexicon as a part of 
human society, and therefore part of a region, and this lexical item passes the nature of 
its status as a potential part of human society to the genitive particle, thereby selecting 
which of the relations is to be interpreted. The mechanics of how this selection occurs 
is via a meaning-shifting operator which takes the noun in question as an argument and 
returns a particular argument which is then itself passed to the genitive construction.
Despite the apparent ability of Jensen & Vikner’s analysis to explain the broad 
variance in the relations which may link the speaker to the denoted object in genitive 
constructions, their proposal suffers from a significant drawback. In particular, they 
rely so heavily on the lexicon in order to account for the acceptability of various gen-
itive constructions that if their aim is to achieve full generality, their analysis must 
become extraordinarily complex and domain specific. Note, for instance, that one of 
the possible relations which may obtain between the speaker and the object denoted 
by the expression my horse as it occurs in (5a) is that of the former having bet on the 
latter. According to J & V’s account, this would be explained in terms of storing this 
potential relation in the lexical entry for horse.
But on this sort of account, the noun dung beetle, for example, is presumably not 
listed in the lexicon as an animal that is customarily raced, and upon which bets can 
be placed. However, nothing prevents us from starting to race dung beetles as a sport, 
at which point one might felicitously exclaim, “My dung beetle is going to win.” At 
this point Jensen & Vikner would presumably have to predict that the lexical entry for 
dung beetle would be updated so as to include bet on as a potential relation in which a 
speaker may hold to a dung beetle in order to license the use of “my dung beetle.”
An even worse problem arises when we note that the sentence “My dung beetle 
is going to win” seems to be felicitous if we are to imagine the sport of dung beetle 
racing. So is the notion of “potential to be raced” currently stored in the lexical en-
try for dung beetle as it stands now? The complexity of the lexicon on the Jensen & 
Vikner account is bounded only by our imaginations, in that case.
Pertainedness and the Per relation
I will now advance an analysis of genitive constructions which I believe remedies 
these problems while also solving the uniqueness problem which Jensen & Vikner 
do not attempt to address directly.2 On this proposal, the semantic contribution of 
2 At one point in their paper they present a derivation which includes definiteness, but they go on 
to discard this portion of the analysis (somewhat inexplicably). See “leaving out this subpart...” on p. 9 
of Jensen & Vikner (2004).
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the genitive construction is to determine a relation R —which I will refer to as a per-
tainedness relation— which serves to link a speaker and an object. While in state-
ments of the form My P is Q the head noun will contribute to the manner in which 
R is determined, R is not itself determined exclusively by the lexical information con-
veyed in an utterance of such a statement. Rather, I maintain that the context in 
which such a statement is uttered plays an essential role in the determination of R.
To a first approximation, my proposed account of the logical form of a statement 
my P is Q will thus take the form
(3’) Q(ix∃R[Per(R,P) ∧ R(I,x) ∧ P(x)])
Note that this formula does not assert that the speaker bears any particular re-
lation to any particular object, but rather that there exists a pertainedness relation 
which bears the relation I have denoted by Per to the head noun P. This relation is 
intended to correspond to a higher-order notion of relatedness which holds between 
a relation R and a property P just in case in a given context (which, as will emerge 
below, I am assuming has an effect by delimiting the range of the initial existential 
quantifier) the speaker would be entitled to refer to an object satisfying P as “my P” 
if he bore R to it.
In order to illustrate how the analysis operates in practice, consider again the sen-
tence
(5 a) My horse is going to win!
as it might be uttered respectively by a horse breeder (context c1), a jockey (context 
c2) and a bettor (context c3). Examining these contexts in more detail will shed light 
on precisely how Per works. In c1, sentence 5a is uttered by a horse breeder. Presum-
ably, his interlocutor is aware that he is the breeder of a horse in the race, the sen-
tence is uttered at the racetrack (or some other venue where watching the race is pos-
sible), and he is not in contact with additional horses at the time of utterance. The 
context c1 thus is involved in the work of Per as it restricts the set of relations which 
might hold between the speaker and the horse. So looking at the expression in (3’) 
(reprinted here), we see a context-sensitive relation Per which picks out all potential 
relationships which could conceivably hold between the speaker and the object in 
question, and as long as one of those relations does hold, and the x is unique, then 
the sentence is true.
(3’) Q(ix∃R[Per(R,P) ∧ R(I,x) ∧ P(x)])
In other words, Q holds of the unique x such that there exists a relation R which 
bears an appropriate pertainedness relation to P according to the context, is such that 
R holds between the speaker and x, and is such that it additionally satisfies P.
This analysis, with its reliance on pragmatics and underspecification, has the 
added feature of tolerating ambiguities as to the appropriate notion of relatedness 
between the speaker and the referent of my P, as occasionally occur in ordinary dis-
course. For instance, if (5) were overheard at the racetrack, a hearer might fail to re-
alize what relationship the speaker was asserting to hold between himself and the 
horse he takes to be the likely winner. But uttered in the context of a discussion on 
betting, a hearer could employ the Gricean Maxim of Relevance (Grice 1975) to 
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conclude that the relevant Per-licensed relation between the speaker and the horse 
was that of the former having bet on the latter.
Explaining uniqueness
The remaining phenomenon to be explained is that of uniqueness. In some in-
stances, it appears to be completely felicitous to utter my P is Q when there is more 
than one object satisfying P to which the speaker bears the appropriate contextually 
determined relation. An example such as
(11) My sister is a doctor and she recommends vitamins
can, for instance, be felicitous in a discourse concerning dietary supplements, even 
if the speaker has more than one sister. However, if the speaker is involved in a dis-
course concerning siblings, where speaker B has more than one sister, the following 
example appears infelicitous:
(12) A: Do you have any siblings?
 B: Yes, my sister is a doctor and my brother is a teacher.
In uttering the first conjunct of his reply in (9), B has strongly implicated that 
he only has only one sister. However the speaker in example (8) has done nothing of 
the sort.
To explain this apparent conflict, I propose a solution which involves func-
tion composition, triggered by the salience of the predicate Q (in a construction 
such as my P is Q) to the context of the discourse. Function composition has been 
put forth as an explanation for a variety of phenomena (e.g. Dowty 1988, Jacob-
son 1992, Barker 2004). To function compose two functions, f and g, is to cre-
ate a new function f . g that is the result of applying f to the result of applying g. 
So f . g(x) is equivalent to f (g(x)). It is vital to note that the final outcome of com-
posing two functions and then applying the resulting function to an argument is 
equivalent to applying the two functions in order, the second taking the output 
of the first.
I extend the work of Barker (Barker 2004) on possessive weak definites, which 
observes that constructions of the form
(13) I hope the cafe is located on the corner of a busy intersection
do not require that there be a unique corner of the intersection; in fact they are com-
pletely felicitous in occurrences such as (13) where it would be impossible for the 
corner to be unique. In order to formalize this intended reading, he employs an 
analysis based on composing the semantics constituents in a non-standard order. As 
Barker puts it,
…the composition of two functions f and g, written as f . g, is defined as in (70):
(70) Function composition: f . g ≡ lx.f (gx)
This definition gives rise to the simple theorem (given in (71))
(71) Theorem: (f . g)h = (lx.f (gx))h = f (gh)        (Barker 2004).
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By way of illustration, if f = [[the]], g = [[corner]], and h = [[of the intersection]], 
the two available readings are the standard
(14) f (g(h)) = the(corner(of the intersection))
and the function-composed reading
(14’) (f . g)(h) = (the . corner)(of the intersection)
In the second of these analyses, the determiner combines first with the relational 
noun [[corner]], and then with the prepositional phrase. This yields the interpreta-
tion that it is the corner (and not the middle, or the side) of the intersection that is 
denoted, thereby preserving uniqueness in picking out one possible location related 
to the intersection, not one possible corner.
I propose to use a similar analysis of possessives of the form my P is Q, illustrat-
ing the function compositional approach with categorial grammar. Much like sim-
ple-typed lambda calculus, categorial grammar can capture the combinatorial possi-
bilities of various elements in a sentence, but unlike lambda calculus, which only has 
one function type, categorial grammar has directional function types which specify 
whether their argument comes from the right or left. The notation as standardly used 
employs left-leaning and right-leaning slashes to indicate this difference. Expressions 
are written as the category of expression they yield, followed by a slash indicating the 
location of their argument (either \ to indicate the argument is to the left of the ex-
pression or / to indicate that the argument is to the right), followed by the type of 
expression they take as an argument. To illustrate, a determiner can be considered to 
be of type NP\N, indicating that it takes an argument of type N to its left, yielding 
an expression of type NP.
Note that expressions can use parentheses as a means of expressing more com-
plicated types. A transitive verb could be written as (S\NP)/NP indicating that it is 
an expression which takes an expression of type NP to its right, yielding an expres-
sion of type (S\NP), which reflects its status at this point in the derivation as a par-
tially saturated verb, equivalent to an intransitive verb in that both are looking for 
an argument of type NP to the left in order to form a complete sentence of type S.
As detailed by Jacobson (Jacobson 1999), the function composition operator 
can be viewed combinatorily as taking an expression of category A/B and one of 
type C into one of category (A/(B\C ))/C . To break this down further, it will be 
useful to look into how these expression types take the same arguments and ul-
timately yield the same result. The difference is in the order in which the argu-
ments are applied. An expression of type A/B is an expression that takes an ex-
pression of type B to the right and yields an expression of type A. If the function 
composition operator is applied to this expression, it results in an expression of 
type (A/(B\C))/C. This is an expression which takes an argument of type C to its 
right and yields an expression of type A/(B\C). This last expression is one which 
takes an expression of type (B\C) to its right, and yields an expression of type A. 
And an expression of type B\C is one that takes a C to its left and yields an ex-
pression of type B. So ultimately in both cases we have applied arguments and 
ended up with an expression of type A. Semantically, this operator can be seen as 
shifting a function f to lgh.f(gh).
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Taking the examples (11) and (12), a standard categorical grammar account of 





As we see above, the verb phrase is-a-doctor is an expression of type S\NP, which 
is to say it is an expression which takes an expression of type NP to its left and yields 
a sentence (type S). The expression my is very much like a determiner in that it takes 
an expression of type N to its right and yields an expression of type NP. The expres-
sion sister is this N, and the expression my sister is the NP which forms the argument 
to the verb phrase is-a-doctor.
Example (15) illustrates the standard account with no function composition. 
This would be the reading which requires uniqueness, as in example (12). How-
ever, we also need to account for the additional reading as available in (11), where 
no uniqueness appears to be required for the sentence to be felicitously interpreted, 
as it would be in (12). In order to achieve the second reading, note that the function 
composition operator can take [[is a doctor]] and lift it, as in
(16) S\NP → (S\(NP/N))\N
Recall example (11):
(11) My sister is a doctor and she recommends vitamins
In this example, because the discourse has made the medical profession par-
ticularly salient, the predicate Q ([[is a doctor]]) is able to compose with the predi-
cate [[sister]] and yield the correct result. Assuming that f = [[my]], g = [[sister]], and 
h = [[is a doctor]], we see that both readings are possible:
(17) (f(g))(h) = (my(sister))(is-a-doctor)
(18) (f)(g . h) = (my)(sister . is-a-doctor)
The tree in (15) corresponds to (17), the first reading. The illustration of the sec-
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The tree in (19) shows the effect of function composition. The predicate is-a-doc-
tor has been lifted by the function composition operator from type S\NP to become 
one of type (S\(NP/N))\N, that is to say, it has become an expression which takes 
an expression of type N to its left, and yields and expression of type S\(NP/N). This 
latter expression, which is a result of the application of the N sister to the lifted is-a-
doctor, itself takes the expression my which is of type NP/N and results in the correct 
sentence type S.
The standard interpretation, as shown in (15), requires that the speaker have only 
one sister, given that [[my]] combines directly with [[sister]] and must pick out the 
unique object which bears the sister relation to the speaker. However, we see in (18) 
and (19) that the functional composition of [[sister]] and [[is-a-doctor]] allows [[my]] 
to combine with the complex [[sister . is-a-doctor]], thus discharging its uniqueness 
requirements on the set of salient “doctor-sisters”, and allowing the utterance to be 
felicitous when the speaker has more than one sister.
Conclusion
The analysis presented in this paper has the advantages of failing to over-burden 
the lexicon with potential control relationships as well as accounting for the unique-
ness requirement that appears to be part of genitive constructions. It also neatly ex-
plains how the same sentence can incur different felicity readings in contrasting con-
texts. Note that this analysis has the added benefit of explaining why although some 
speakers do find sentences such as
(20) ?My cat is orange, and my other cat is black
felicitous in some cases, a sentence such as
(21) #My orange cat is fat, but my black cat is not
is clearly infelicitous when the speaker has more than one orange cat.
This function composition based analysis, an extension of work by Barker 
(Barker 2004), solves the problem of explaining how definiteness requirements seem 
to be in effect in some instances and not in others. Future work in this area could ex-
plore whether the analysis given here is flexible enough to extend to other types of 
constructions which appear to require definiteness.
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